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ABSTRACT
While the existence of a ‘Democratic Peace’ (DP) is widely accepted,
the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely
ﬁght one another are highly contested. A ‘commercial/capitalist
peace’ counterargument maintains that the relationship between
democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is
greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter
that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic
nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes
novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate’s
micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity
and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and
Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative
measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and
cultural diﬀerence, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against
its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western
democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism
around the world today, a better understanding of the role of
regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war
and peace – is urgently needed.
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Introduction
In Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant (1795) argued that citizens of democracies do not view
each other as threatening, so rarely go to war. The ﬂip-side of democratic amity, David
Hume (1742) had pointed out earlier, was that democratic publics exhibit an ‘imprudent
vehemence’ or enmity towards dictatorships. Both men were suggesting that perceived
regime type (a macro, state-level issue) shaped how democratic citizens felt towards
other countries (a micro, individual-level issue). Individual-level feelings of amity/enmity
among democratic publics, they implied, would then promote cooperation/conﬂict at
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the inter-state level. For instance, democratic citizens would be more likely to feel enmity
towards dictatorships, increasing the odds of war with them.
Today, while the empirical existence of a ‘democratic peace’ (DP) is widely accepted, the
various theories used to explain it (e.g. Doyle 1983; Maoz and Russett 1993; Moravcsik
1997) remain highly contested – and their micro-foundations in public opinion remain
largely unexplored. Rather than supplant existing DP approaches, in this research note
we explore an implication of DP theory that has to date not received much attention:
namely that if DP theory (or its rivals) holds true, we should observe a particular pattern
of enmity/amity among democratic publics toward diﬀerent countries. Importantly, war/
peace is not our dependent measure. Instead, we seek to explain how democratic
publics feel/think about foreign countries, which Kant, Hume and others in the DP litera-
ture generally assume to be a vital antecedent of cooperation or conﬂict.
In 1972, Dean Babst (1972) ﬁrst reported a correlation between democracy and peace,
and researchers in the late 1970s and 1980s debated whether the correlation was spurious
or not (e.g. Chan 1984; Ray 1995; Vasquez 2000). Scholarship in the 1990s then began to
theorize about structural and normative causes of the democratic peace (Russett 1993).
Structural approaches focused on macro drivers like the political accountability built
into democracies with their voting systems (e.g. Huth and Allee 2002), how the enhanced
signaling of resolve by democracies decreases the likelihood of miscommunication and
conﬂict (‘audience costs’; e.g. Fearon 1994; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001), and the role of
the separation of powers in allowing democratic opposition to the use of force to
inhibit the initiation or escalation of conﬂict (Maoz and Russett 1993).
Normative DP theorists focused on norm externalization: how democratic norms of
compromise and non-violent conﬂict resolution are projected from the domestic to the
international arena (Gaubatz 1996; Russett 1993). Democracies cooperate because they
share a willingness to compromise and similar values (Oren 1995). The structural and nor-
mative drivers of the DP, furthermore, work together, as democratic institutions like the
freedoms of speech and the press, and regular elections, translate the public’s Liberal pre-
ferences into foreign policy (Owen 1994).
When they interact with non-democracies, however, such norms no longer apply.
Democracies and authoritarian regimes engage in more militarized disputes (Braumoeller
1997; Risse-Kappen 1995). Following Kant and Hume, DP theorists argue that democracies
tend to project the assumptions of compromise and non-violence onto the motives of
other democracies – but not onto authoritarian states, which are viewed with suspicion.
Realist assumptions of anarchy, relative gains, and defection, therefore, predominate in
relations between democracies and dictatorships (Goldsmith 2007; Risse-Kappen 1995).
The tendency of democracies to ﬁght non-democracies appears, furthermore, to be par-
ticularly true between neighbouring states (Vasquez 2011).
DP theory has not gone without challenge, however. These take two broad forms: (1)
friendly counterarguments that fall under the ‘Kantian tripod’ of international institutions,
economic interdependence, and democratic politics and (2) hostile counterarguments
from outside of Liberal Theory. The primary friendly counterargument is that of a ‘commer-
cial or capitalist peace’ (e.g. Gartzke 2007; Polachek 1980). It argues that the relationship
between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade
among democracies, which contributes to increased economic interdependence (McDo-
nald 2009). The interests of democratic states become intertwined through contract-
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intensive development and liberal economic institutions. The costs of war become too
high and cooperation prevails (McDonald 2009; Mousseau 2009).
A major hostile counterargument comes from IR Realists who argue that it is alliances
among democratic states (e.g. Farber and Gowa 1995; Rosato 2003), trust built through
repeated interactions and cooperative behaviour (Daase 2006; Kydd 2005), self-enforcing
bargains (Lipson 2003), and/or their shared perceptions of the balance of power (Layne
1994), that causes peace among democracies. The democratic nature of their political
systems, in this view, is irrelevant. The emergence of an era of peaceful relations
between democratic states after the end of World War II was the result of tensions
between East and West during the Cold War and the necessity for collective security –
not the domestic or normative constraints of a democratic form of government (Gowa
2011; Levy 2008). In this Realist view, it is the balance of power among states in a
system that determines war and peace; regime type has little to do with it.
These rival explanations for the DP all operate at the macro, state-level. They tend,
however, to assume individual-level drivers of public attitude formation that are then
depicted as drivers of war/peace. Democratic publics are assumed to dis/like foreign
countries based on whether they are non/democratic, un/proﬁtable trade partners, or
create in/security. These diﬀerent assumptions about the drivers of public attitude for-
mation do not appear to have been empirically tested, however.
This Research Note utilizes a three-country feeling thermometer measure from a 2014
YouGov dataset the ﬁrst author designed, and a 2014 Chicago Council on Global Aﬀairs
(CCGA) survey as four dependent measures to explore the underlying drivers of patterns
of amity and enmity among a subset of democratic citizens. It shifts attention from the
state and the macro-level nature of most DP theory to the micro, individual-level issue
of attitude formation. Speciﬁcally, it asks why the American, British, French, and German
publics consistently like some countries, like Japan, more than others, like China. Utilizing
Freedom House and other quantitative measures of political freedom, economic interde-
pendence and trade, military strength, and latent power, it utilizes multivariate regression
analysis to pit the Democratic Peace against its major rival explanations like the commer-
cial/capitalist peace and Realist power balancing to explain patterns of enmity/amity atti-
tude formation among these democratic publics.
Why use cross-national feeling thermometer data? First, the people and their percep-
tions matter. ‘The role of the public requires far more attention’, Jarrod Hayes (2012,
783) rightly argues in a review of the DP literature. Much recent work in the DP has
focused on the views of democratic leaders, such as how Roosevelt viewed Hitler
(Farnham 2003), or how Tony Blair and Bill Clinton viewed Serbia in the context of
the Kosovo conﬂict (Schafer and Walker 2006). In such work, what matters is elite judg-
ments about friends and foes. But in democracies, the ‘electoral connection’ ensures
that politicians pay careful attention to public opinion when they make their foreign
policies (Aldrich et al. 2006). For instance, an early longitudinal analysis of US survey
data revealed that changes in public opinion on international events regularly preceded
eventual changes in US foreign policy (Page and Shapiro 1983). Given that a basic
requirement of a causal argument is that a cause precedes an eﬀect, this ﬁnding
strongly suggests that public opinion is a major driver of elite foreign policy
decision-making in democracies like the US. American elites, furthermore, are Ameri-
cans too. Politicians do not just respond to their constituents in a self-interested
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manner; they also represent them in the sense of sharing their feelings, attitudes, and
policy preferences (Knecht 2010, 5).
Second, measurement matters. While feeling thermometer data are more indirect than
existing dependent measures in the DP literature like the Militarized Interstate Dispute
(MID) data from the correlates of war (COW) project, it does not suﬀer from the coding
issues that embroil the MID in controversy (e.g. Downes and Sechser 2012; Reiter, Stam,
and Horowitz 2016). Furthermore, unlike a binary dependent ‘variable’ of war or no war
that barely varies, the 2014 feeling thermometer data used here is a dependent
measure that truly varies, on 11- and 101-point scales. Greater variation reduces measure-
ment error, decreasing the possibility of type II error, or false-negatives.
Third, replication with novel data sources matters. To our knowledge, feeling ther-
mometer data has not yet been used in studies of the DP. A primary critique of the DP
has been that the eﬀect of democracy on peace is spurious (e.g. Farber and Gowa 1995).
Previous research (e.g. Bremer 1993; Moaz and Russett 1992) has largely used MIDS data
as the dependentmeasure to counter that the DP is not the product of some other covariate,
like trade or power politics. By contrast, we seek to extend the work of Jakobsen, Jakobsen,
and Ekevold (2016), who used a binary yes/no bellicosity measure from the World Values
Survey (WVS; ‘…would you be willing to ﬁght for your country?’) to argue that the citizens
of democracies are more paciﬁstic than the citizens of non-democracies. That research
powerfully demonstrated the utility of survey data in elucidating the micro-foundations of
normative DP theories that suggest that domestic norms of peaceful conﬂict resolution
are externalized. It did not, however, address whether survey data can also show that the
citizens of democracies restrict such paciﬁst norm externalization to fellow democracies
and not to non-democracies – the other central leg of normative DP theories. Feeling ther-
mometer data provides a new way to retest rival explanations for why democracies go to
war more often with non-democracies than with democracies.
In short, we propose putting both Kant and Hume to the test against their rivals: do
democratic publics dis/like foreign countries based more on whether they are non/demo-
cratic, sources of in/security, or un/proﬁtable trade partners? Given the resurgence of
authoritarianism in the twenty-ﬁrst century, a better understanding of the role of
regime type in driving patterns of enmity/amity among democratic publics – and thus
potentially war and peace – is urgently needed.
Measures
Dependent variables
Feeling thermometer scores for the United States (CCGA 2014) and three major Western Euro-
pean countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, YouGov 2014) were used to
measure feelings towards foreign countries. The response anchors for all surveys were ‘very
cold, unfavorable’ and ‘very warm, favorable’ (French: ‘très froid, défavorable’ and ‘très chaleur-
eux, favorable’; German: ‘sehr kalt, negativ’ and ‘sehr warm, positiv’) on 11- and 101-point
scales respectively. Both were converted to 0° to 100° scales to allow for comparison.
The Chicago Council for Global Aﬀairs (CCGA) US survey was conducted online by GfK
Custom Research in Palo Alto, California from May 6 to 29, 2014. It consists of a represen-
tative national sample of 2108 US adult citizens. The margin of sampling error for the full
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US sample is ±2.5. The Western European survey was conducted online by YouGov, also
based in Palo Alto, California, from April 16 to May 5, 2014. It consists of parallel nationally
representative samples of 3000 British, French, and German (1000 each) adult citizens. The
margin of error for the YouGov sample is ±3.8%.
Figures 1 and 2 are bar charts presenting the mean scores for each foreign country
included in the feeling thermometers, for the Western European and American samples
respectively (Cf. Gries 2014: Fig. 0.3). They are presented in a left to right ascending cold
to warm sequence that captures our central empirical puzzle: Why do the democratic
citizens of Western Europe and the United States feel cooler towards some countries
(e.g. North Korea, Pakistan, Russia) and warmer towards others (e.g. Germany, Britain,
France)?
The mean feelings displayed in Figures 1 and 2 are remarkably consistent across time.
The Chicago Council has been using a feeling thermometer in its US surveys for decades,
and individual country means do not vary much. For instance, in eleven surveys between
Figure 1. Western European Feelings towards Foreign Countries, 2014. Note: In ascending order.
‘Western Europe’ averages the 3,000 respondents from the UK, France, and Germany. Data source:
YouGov 2014.
Figure 2. American Feelings towards Foreign Countries, 2014. Note: In ascending order. Data Source:
Chicago Council on Global Aﬀairs, 2014.
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1978 and 2010, mean American feelings towards Japan hovered between 52° and 61°,
while in ten surveys over the same period American feelings towards Israel hovered
between 53° and 59°. The cool to warm sequence of enmity to amity is also remarkably
stable. Given how little Americans (and Western Europeans) know about the world,
what best explains this remarkable consistency in mean national feelings of un/favourabil-
ity towards speciﬁc foreign countries, and their sequence?
Independent: democratic variables
2014 Freedom House scores were used to measure how politically free or democratic
each country was in 2014. Because many countries claim to be democratic (e.g. the
‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’) and perform that claim through sham elec-
tions, Freedom House evaluates each country on a lengthy list of political rights and
civil liberties separately to ensure that their measure is multifaceted and robust. For
Freedom House, ‘political rights’ captures electoral process, political pluralism and par-
ticipation, and the functioning of government, while ‘civil liberties’ covers the freedoms
of expression and belief (religion), associational and organizational rights, rule of law,
and personal autonomy and individual rights.1 We averaged their political rights and
civil liberties scores together to create a single measure of the level of democracy in
each country. Each were then reverse coded so that a higher score on the 1–7 scale
is more democratic.
Although Freedom House scores are widely used and have been validated in multiple
studies, we also looked at Polity4 and V-Dem scores as alternate measures of democracy.
Polity 4, founded by Ted Gurr, captures a ‘regime authority spectrum’ from ‘−10 (heredi-
tary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy)’.2 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem),
cohosted at the Universities of Gothenburg (Sweden) and Notre Dame (USA), ‘aims to
produce better Indicators of Democracy’.3 Results reported below were robust to using
these two other widely used measures of democracy, which is hardly surprising consider-
ing they each correlated with the Freedom House scores at ≥.90.4
Independent: realist variables
Latent power index. Following Lebow and Valentino (2009, 406), latent state power is
operationalized by multiplying a state’s gross domestic product (GDP) and population
in 2014. In their view, the combination of the absolute size of a country’s economy
and its population is ‘the most objective representation of latent material capabilities’.
This is what matters for Realists, as both military personnel and spending can be rapidly
increased in wartime. GDP is the total value in US dollars of all goods and services pro-
duced within a country for a given year.5 The population measure used was also from
the World Bank and represents the total number of persons living within a country, irre-
spective of citizenship or legal status.6
Military spending as a percentage of GDP includes all defense-related spending in 2014,
including pay for active duty soldiers, reserves, and civilian employees.7
Military personnel is the total number of active duty personnel in the armed forces of a
given state in 2014. This includes regular troops as well as those in training, such as
reserves or paramilitary forces, who could replace regular troops in the line of duty.8
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Independent: capitalist/commercial variables
Total trade index. The total trade index was operationalized as imports plus exports
between a focal country (e.g. the US) and a target country (e.g. China).9
Trade openness was operationalized as the ratio of total trade to GDP (imports +
exports/GDP). Gartzke and Li (2003) found trade openness to be negatively correlated
with MID onset.
Capital account openness. From the Chinn-Ito Index based on IMF ratings of the level of
ﬁnancial openness for a given country. Operationalized by tabulating restrictions on cross-
border ﬁnancial transactions.
FDI ﬂows are another measure of bilateral economic openness and interdependence
(Gartzke 2007). They were operationalized as the net in and outﬂows of foreign direct
investments as a percent of GDP (investments + divestments/GDP).
Control variable (covariate)
Distance. ‘Distance may not make the heart grow fonder’, writes Eric Gartzke (2007, 176),
‘but it does appear to discourage interstate disputes’. It is therefore included as a control
variable. We did not test for contiguity, however, because very few target countries in our
dataset share a border with our four focal countries.
Results
We performed country-level analyses of aggregate national data (e.g. the national mean
rating of feelings towards foreign countries). Aggregate data may be more reliable than
individual data because averaging individual responses smooths out the noise of individ-
ual idiosyncrasy (Fielding and Gilbert 2006, 13). Analyses of aggregate data thus do not
require the large sample sizes that individual-level data do. Analysing national aggregate
data can also reveal macro-level or collective phenomena that are not reducible to individ-
ual-level characteristics (Na et al. 2010).
Zero-order correlations
As illustrated in Table 1, the target country’s Freedom House (row 1) score was both posi-
tively and massively (all r > .66) associated (all ps < .001) with each national sample’s mean
warmth towards that country. This provides strong initial support for the DP.
The target country’s military spending (row 3) was negatively associated (ps between
.05 and .01) with each democracy’s warmth towards that country, but there were no
zero-order associations between warmth and the size of its military personnel (row 4),
or its latent power (row 2). This provides weak, mixed evidence for the Realist
counterargument.
Capital account openness (row 7) was positively associated (all ps < .01) with
each democracy’s warmth towards that country, but there were no zero-order
associations between warmth and total trade (row 5), trade openness (row 6), or
FDI ﬂows (row 8). This provides weak, mixed evidence for the Capitalist Peace
counterargument.
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Table 1 also reveals that distance was negatively associated with American feelings
towards foreign countries, but not British, French, or German feelings. Distance is therefore
safely dropped as a control from the ‘Western European’ regressions below that average
across the three Western European countries.
Predicting warmth towards foreign countries
Zero-order correlations cannot distinguish between true and spurious associations. To test
our competing Democratic, Capitalist, and Realist hypotheses, we ran a series of hierarch-
ical multiple regressions in which the predictive power of Freedom House scores was pit
against that of the other country indexes. Initial country level regressions revealed similar
patterns across the UK, France, and Germany samples. For the sake of parsimony, their
data was therefore aggregated together and called ‘Western Europe’ for the analyses
reported below. Because of this aggregation, distance is not included in the Western
Europe regressions. Given that distance did not correlate with feelings in the UK,
France, and Germany (Table 1, row 9), it is likely not necessary anyways.
We ﬁrst explored the hostile Realist challenge to the Democratic Peace, pitting all three
Realist variables – latent power, military spending, and military personnel – against
Freedom House scores. As illustrated in Table 2, the target country’s Freedom House
score was a unique positive predictor of both Western European and American feelings
towards that country, even after controlling for the three Realist indexes (Table 2,
Model 2).
In the Western European data reported ﬁrst, none of the three Realist variables was a
statistically signiﬁcant unique predictor of feeling thermometer scores. Together, they
did account for 9% of variance in feelings towards foreign countries beyond the 50% pre-
dicted by the Freedom House score, but this represents over ﬁve times less explanatory
power.
In the American data, none of the three Realist variables was a statistically signiﬁcant
unique predictor of feeling thermometer scores either.
We then tested the friendly Capitalist/Commercial Peace challenge to the DP, pitting
our four capitalist measures against Freedom House scores. As illustrated in Table 3,
only the Freedom House score was a unique and powerful predictor across both
samples. None of the four capitalist indicators was signiﬁcant in the Western European
Table 1. Zero-order correlations between country-level warmth and a target nation’s political and
socio-economic conditions, by country.
UK feeling France feeling Germany feeling US feeling
Freedom House scores .66*** .67*** .67*** .85***
Latent power −.01 −.02 −.11 −.03
Military spending −.54** −.54** −.51* −.48*
Military personnel −.33 −.27 −.41 −.23
Total trade .22 .25 .20 .27
Trade openness −.06 .02 −.00 .26
Capital account openness .59** .61** .55** .67**
FDI ﬂows .00 −.11 −.17 .29
Distance −.20 −.23 −.25 −.40*
Note: Latent power = GDP * population.
Data Sources: UK, FR, DE: YouGov 2014; US: Chicago Council on Global Aﬀairs, 2014.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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regression. And in the American regression, only FDI ﬂows uniquely predicted feelings, but
at just p < .05. Neither total trade, trade openness, nor capital account openness were sig-
niﬁcant predictors. In the Western European and American data, furthermore, Freedom
House scores accounted for a substantial 55% and 71% of the variance in country
warmth scores respectively.
Table 2. The realist challenge: Hierarchical regression pitting democracy vs. power-related indexes to
predict warmth towards foreign countries.
Western European data
(N = 23) Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B SE B β B SE B β
Freedom House scores 4.21 .92 .71*** 3.35 1.14 .56**
Latent power .00 .00 .30
Military spending −.56 .51 −.20
Military personnel .00 .00 −.29
R2 .50 .59
F for change in R2 20.88*** 1.43
American data
(N = 25) Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B SE B β B SE B β
Freedom House scores 5.39 .69 .85*** 5.41 .64 .86***
Latent power .00 .00 .27
Military spending .04 .30 −01
Military personnel .00 .00 −.09
Distance −.00 .00 −.31**
R2 .73 .86
F for change in R2 61.14*** 4.68**
Note: Western European feeling ratings were averaged across UK, France, and Germany.
Data Sources: UK, FR, DE: YouGov 2014; US: Chicago Council on Global Aﬀairs, 2014.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 3. The capitalist peace challenge: Hierarchical regression pitting democracy against trade
balance to predict warmth towards foreign countries.
Western European data
(N = 24) Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B SE B β B SE B β
Freedom house scores 5.33 1.20 .74*** 5.38 1.67 .75**
Trade total .00 .00 .36
Trade openness −8,438,891.17 11,895,501 −.11
Capital account openness 1.14 1.83 .14
FDI ﬂows .76 1.67 .07
R2 .55 .71
F for change in R2 19.61*** 1.64
American data
(N = 25) Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B SE B β B SE B β
Freedom House scores 5.37 .81 .84*** 3.94 .73 .62***
Trade total .00 .00 .15
Trade openness 4,556,800.52 8,505,700.78 .05
Capital account openness 1.95 1.14 .22
FDI ﬂows 2.99 1.16 .25*
Distance −.00 .00 −.18
R2 .71 .90
F for change in R2 43.40*** 4.93**
Note: For European data, trade balance was the average balance of a country’s trade with UK, France, and Germany.
Data Sources: UK, FR, DE: YouGov 2014; US: Chicago Council on Global Aﬀairs, 2014.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Conclusion
Students of the DP (e.g. Nye 1993; Owen 1994) have long called for a better understanding
of the underlying processes that allow democracies to avoid war with each other. This
paper utilizes nationally representative feeling thermometer data to explore the micro-
foundations of attitude formation that underlie the DP debate. It ﬁnds that patterns of
public opinion toward foreign countries support DP theory against Realist approaches
that emphasize power (whether operationalized in latent economic and demographic
terms, or with more proximate military measures) as the key driver of feelings of amity/
enmity among democratic publics. It also supports DP theory against the friendly
Liberal Capitalist/Commercial Peace counterargument: the eﬀect of regime type on atti-
tudes does not appear to be spurious; trade and economic self-interest do not trump poli-
tics in shaping American and Western European feelings towards foreign countries.
Feeling thermometer data, in short, empirically support both Kant andHume: the citizens of
democracies both like and trust one another – but can be quite bellicose and distrustful
towards non-democracies. In a twenty-ﬁrst century where authoritarian countries like China,
Russia, and Turkey are thriving, this does not bode well for peace in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Future directions
This research note only presents correlational evidence of the link between patterns of
amity/enmity in democratic public opinion and regime type at the aggregate level.
More research is needed at the individual level to delve deeper into the psychological
microprocesses of international attitude formation. For instance, to explore how percep-
tions of just how democratic a country is shapes people’s amity/enmity toward them,
experimental work could vary how non/democratic a foreign country is across diﬀerent
treatment conditions, and then measure feelings/attitudes and foreign policy preferences
towards it. To explicitly study the mechanism that establish this link, further experiments
could then explore whether mis/trust and norms of compromise – variables emphasized in
the DP literature – are the correct mechanisms for any eﬀects found. In short, additional
research should check whether the macro-level pattern reported here comes about via
the individual-level processes assumed here and more broadly in the DP literature.
We only explored the underlying drivers of feelings of amity and enmity towards
foreign countries among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Are
our conclusions speciﬁc only to ‘democratic publics’ or even ‘Western European’ citizens?
Future research could explore whether feeling thermometer data from other democratic
publics replicates these ﬁndings, and whether or not they replicate in less democratic set-
tings. Moreover, are these supposedly fundamental mechanisms posited by Western phi-
losophers truly fundamental to humanity, or are they simply Western?
As with all research into the international system, it is important to understand whether
what we observe is time-bound. Given that our results are centred on four powerful
western countries, how much of our ﬁndings are the result of strong alliances? Some
fear that these alliances are currently fraying; will our conclusions hold across time and
in diﬀerent international environments?
Finally, how much variation is there within nations? Working with nationally represen-
tative but aggregated data, we have treated each national public as a whole. Might
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subgroups diﬀer? For instance, might members of far-right groups within democracies
care less about whether a foreign country is democratic or not? And might diﬀerent sub-
groups have systematically diﬀerent views about whether a speciﬁc foreign country is
more democratic or authoritarian? For instance, the Japanese far-right, threatened by
South Korean criticisms of Japan’s wartime conduct, often delegitimizes such critiques
by depicting South Korea as a dictatorship rather than a democracy (Suzuki 2019).
Future work could explore such moderators of the eﬀect of regime type on public percep-
tions of amity/enmity.
Notes
1. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology#.UuEq87Qo71I
2. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html
3. https://www.v-dem.net/en/
4. 2014 Freedom House scores correlated highly with both Polity4 and V-Dem scores for 2014
(both rs≥ .90). We, therefore, tested collinearity in the context of predicting our US and Euro-
pean feeling thermometer scores. The VIF (variance inﬂation factor) for the Freedom House
score was 13, above the conventional cutoﬀ of 10, so we decided that we needed to
choose one. All three democracy measures also correlated with our dependent measures,
the 2014 US and European feeling thermometer scores. However, Polity4 correlated at just
r = .65 and .58 respectively, while the others correlated at r > .70 and .80 respectively. We
therefore decided to drop Polity4, leaving Freedom House and VDem, which are largely inter-
changeable. They correlated extremely highly at r = .95, and their predictive power was also
similar. Here we use Freedom House. But similar results can be found using V-Dem.
5. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
6. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
7. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
8. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1
9. Bilateral trade balances were also explored, but correlated too highly (r =−.93) with total trade
with the US so were dropped. Regression results did not change if the trade balance variable
was used instead of total trade.
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